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Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
The Recent Congressional Enactment Pertaining to Wages,
Hours and Child Labor
By S. HAROLD SHEFELMAN of the Seattle Bar
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,1 approved by the Presi-
dent on June 25, 1938, is one of the most far-reaching social and
economic measures ever enacted by the Congress of the United
States. Its popular designation as the "Wages and Hours Law"
overlooks the very important provisions of the Act aimed at the
restriction of child labor. Acting under the power to "regulate
commerce with foreign nations and among the several states and
with the Indian tribes", 2 and in the guise of protecting and pre-
venting interference with interstate commerce, the law was enacted
for the real purpose of improving the economic condition of work-
ers by increasing wages and decreasing hours. Becoming effective
on October 24, 1938, the Fair Labor Standards Act is too fresh
and untried to warrant any appraisal of its effects. Varying esti-
mates of the number of persons to be affected by the minimum
wage provisions have been made. In general, it can be safely
stated that the minimum wage provisions will be felt largely in
the South, where wage standards have been lowest. The hours
provision, however, which requires the payment of time and a half
for overtime in excess of the maximum hour week fixed in the Act
is already being felt generally throughout the country.
It is interesting to note that affected industry, while somewhat
bewildered by the difficulty in construing certain of the provisions
of the Act and applying them to their own situations, has never-
theless adopted a cooperative attitude. The Administrator ap-
pointed by the President, Mr. Elmer F. Andrews, 3 has on his part
adopted a similar attitude of cooperation with affected industries
and employers. The American Bar Association has recently, by
formal action of the House of Delegates, expressed its opinion that
employers, labor organizations, and lawyers for either, should
cooperate in a fair trial of the Act.' Thus it would appear that a
'Public Act No. 718, 75th Congress.
1U. S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8.
3Recently N. Y. State Industrial Commissioner.
4On January 10, 1939, the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association. at its meeting in Chicago, adopted the following resolution
recommended by the "Committee on Labor, Employment and Social
Security":
"That the Association is of the opinion that employers, labor organ-
izations, and lawyers for either, should cooperate in a fair trial of the
labor standards prescribed by the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,
without waiver of rights, and that suitable amendments to clarify the
Act along lines consistent with its basic purposes should be drafted and
acted upon by the Congress at the earliest practicable time."
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measure which would but a few short years ago have been received
with general hostility by industry, is now accepted without particu-
lar shock and with all prospects of a fair trial.
It was, of course, inevitable that ambiguities and uncertainties
would be discovered in so novel a bit of legislation when put into
practice. Although it is but in its crawling infancy, the Admin-
istrator has already recommended three immediate changes in the
Fair Labor Standards Act." These recommendations, made on his
own initiative without awaiting public pressure for change, augur
rather well for the administration of the Act.
Space will not permit of a comprehensive enumeration of the
provisions of the Act or of the problems which have already arisen
in its application, but an attempt will be made to briefly state and
discuss its salient features and the more important problems which
have arisen to date, and in conclusion reference will be made to
the problem of constitutionality which is ever present in pioneering
social and economic legislation.
Declaration of Policy
It has become common in recent years for both the national and
state legislatures to preface legislation aimed at the correction of
economic evils with findings that such evils exist, because of the
effect of such findings upon judicial determinations under the Act.
This pattern is followed here, and it is definitely found that the
existence, in industries engaged in commerce or in the production
of goods for commerce, of labor conditions detrimental to the main-
tenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health,
efficiency and general well-being of workers, harms and interferes
with interstate commerce in its various phases.6 It is therefore
declared to be the policy of the Act to correct and eliminate such
conditions by the exercise of Congressional power over interstate
commerce without substantially curtailing employment or earning
power.7 While it has been stated that the primary purpose of the
Act is to improve the health and living conditions of workers, the
continued reiteration throughout the Act" of the provision that
OThe Seattle Times of January 19, 1939, reported that Mr. Andrews
suggested these amendments to the Act in testimony before a House ap-
propriations subcommittee:
"1. Simplification of the law without change in its fundamental prin-
ciples.
2. Provisions relieving an employer from retroactive penalties if -he
follows Andrews' advice and later finds the advice bad by virtue of
court decisions.
3. Congressional definition of the area of agricultural production, in
which workers are partly exempt from the Act."
'See. 2 (a).
See. 2 (b).
8Sec. 2 (b); See. 8 (a), (b), (c), (e); Sec. 14.
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nothing shall be done which shall substantially curtail employment
indicates the further hope that increasing wages and decreasing
hours will result in more widespread employment.
Definitions
The intent of Congress to make the Fair Labor Standards Act
comprehensive and broad in its application is plainly evident in the
definitions given the essential words or expressions of the Act.
"Commerce" is defined as trade, commerce, transportation,
transmission, or communication among the several states or from
any state to any place outside thereof,' and would necessarily cover
the transportation, radio, telegraph, telephone and similar in-
dustries.
"Industry" is defined as a trade, business, industry or branch
thereof, or group of industries in which individuals are gainfully
employed.10
Perhaps the most important and at the same time broadest defi-
nition is that of the word "produced". It will be remembered that
the Act is directed at the correction of conditions existing in in-
dustries engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce. It is important, therefore, to know what "produced"
means, and produced is here stated to mean produced, manufac-
tured, mined, handled, or in any other manner worked on in any
state. Further, an employee is deemed to have been engaged in
the production of goods if he was employed in producing, manufac-
turing, mining, handling, transporting, or in any other manner
working on such goods, or in any process or occupation necessary
to the production thereof."
Obviously, the effect of the Act is not limited to the persons who
actually perform labor upon the goods. It is generally believed
that persons employed in an establishment which produces goods
for interstate commerce will come within the purview of the Act
if their services are a necessary part of the ordinary operation of
the establishment, and such employees as stenographers, clerks, and
maintenance workers will therefore no doubt be included.
Having determined when one is engaged in the production of
goods, it would naturally be expected that the Act would then con-
tain a definition which would enable one to determine when the
production is for interstate commerce, but there is no such defi-
nition. However, the following interpretation has been placed upon
the Act by the office of the general counsel for the Administrator :12
"The wage and hour provisions of the Act are applica-
'Sec. 3 (b).
"°Sec. 3 (h).
1See. 3 (j).
11U. S. Dept. of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, Office of the General
Counsel, Release No. R-113, December 2, 1938: Interpretative Bulletin
No. 5.
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able to employees 'engaged in (interstate) commerce or
in the production of goods for (interstate) commerce.'
Employees are engaged in the production of goods for
commerce where the employer intends or hopes or has
reason to believe that the goods or any unsegregated part
of them will move in interstate commerce. If, however,
the employer does not intend or hope or have reason to
believe that the goods in production will move in inter-
state commerce, the fact that the goods ultimately do move
in interstate commerce would not bring employees en-
gaged in the production of these goods within the purview
of the Act. The facts at the time that the goods are being
produced determine whether an employee is engaged in
the production of goods for commerce and not any subse-
quent act of his employer or of some third party. Of
course, the fact that the goods do move in interstate com-
merce is strong evidence that the employer intended,
hoped, or had reason to believe that the goods would move
in interstate commerce.
"As indicated above, whether the employees are en-
gaged 'in the production of goods for (interstate) com-
merce' depends upon circumstances as they exist at the
time the goods are being produced, not upon some subse-
quent event that may or may not be in the control of the
producer."
It would thus appear that in some respects the Fair Labor
Standards Act goes farther in its application than the Wagner
Act, although in other respects it does not go as far.
If the employees are not engaged in the production of goods for
commerce as defined by general counsel, or as it may otherwise
be defined, then it would seem that the mere fact that the goods
"come in competition" with other products moving in interstate
commerce would not bring the employees under the Act.
"Agriculture" is defined to include not only farming, but also
dairying, raising of livestock, bees, fur bearing animals, or poultry
and other practices performed by a farmer as an incident to his
farming operations, including lumbering.'3
"Wage" is defined to include the reasonable cost of furnishing
an employee with board, lodging, or other facilities if they are
customarily furnished. 4
"Oppressive child labor" is defined at length,' but will be dis-
cussed in this paper in a subsequent section covering that general
problem.
"Sec. 3 (f).
"Sec. 3 (m).
"Sec. 3 (1).
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There is specifically excluded from the definition of "employer"
the United States or any state or political subdivision of a state, or
any labor organization (other than when acting as an employer).",
Administration
The Wage and Hour Division is created in the Department of
Labor to administer the Act under the direction of an Adminis-
trator to be appointed by the President, with the advice and consent
of the Senate.17 The Administrator is authorized to appoint the
necessary employees, subject to the civil service laws.'8 The pro-
vision italicized, together with the later provision that in the ap-
pointment and promotion of employees of the administration
no political test or qualification shall be permitted or given consid-
eration but they shall be made on the basis of merit and efficiency,
indicate a desire by the enactors of this statute to obtain a fair
administration of this Act. The presence of these admonitions or
restraints is in accordance with the thought of many who are inter-
ested in the proper development of administrative law in this
country.
The Administrator is authorized to establish regional agencies
and to utilize voluntary services, the bureaus of the Department
of Labor, and state and local agencies.'9 The Administrator and
his representatives are given the necessary investigatory power..
2
1
Employers are required to make and preserve records of employ-
ment and to make such reports therefrom to the Administrator as
he may prescribe by regulation.
2 1
Unlike the N. R. A., no compliance stamps or certificates are
required by the Act. While it may be deemed advisable for sellers
of goods to issue such certificates to reassure purchasers, their
issuance will not serve as protection to the purchasers.
The authority of the Administrator to issue binding interpreta-
tions under the Act is quite limited, and in interpretations here-
tofore rendered he has been careful to caution against the accept-
ance of such interpretations as protective to the persons relying
upon them except in those specific instances where the statute
directs the Administrator to make regulations. 22 The Adminis-
"Sec. e (d).
"7Sec. 4 (a).
"Sec. 4 (b).
"Sec. 4 (b); Sec. 11 (b).
"Sec. 11 (a).
nSec. 11 (c).2In Interpretative Bulletin No. 5 (See Note 12, supra), the following
statement is made:
"The caution must again be stated that interpretations announced by
the Administrator, except in certain specific instances where the statute
directs the Administrator to make various regulations and definitions,
serve only to indicate the construction of the law which will guide the
Administrator in the performance of his administrative duties unless he
Is directed otherwise by the authoritative ruling of the courts or unless
he shall subsequently decide that his prior interpretation is Incorrect."
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trator has no authority to make a binding determination of the
all important question whether an employer or employee comes
within the purview of the Act, and an employer acting pursuant
to the Administrator's advisory opinion in that respect may still
find himself subject to liability to his employees under the perti-
nent provisions of the Act. It is expected, however, that the Ad-
ministrator would not attempt to invoke any of the penalties of
the Act against an employer following such an advisory opinion.
The administration of the child labor provisions is placed with
the chief of the Children's Bureau in the Department of Labor.28
Minimum Wages
Every employer is required to pay to each employee engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce not less than
twenty-five cents an hour for the first year after October 24, 1938;
not less than thirty cents an hour for the six years following, end-
ing October 24, 1945; and not less than forty cents an hour there-
after, except that following October 24, 1945, the Administrator
may by appropriate order permit the payment of a wage less than
forty cents but not less than thirty cents if he finds it necessary so
to do in order to prevent substantial curtailment of employment in
the industry.24
It is the express policy of the Act, however, to reach the objective
of a universal minimum wage of forty cents an hour as rapidly as
is economically feasible without substantially curtailing employ-
ment,25 and it is not only possible but decidedly likely that wages
in excess of the minima referred to above, but not to exceed forty
cents per hour, will be established in various industries in the near
future, and in any event, long before October 24, 1945.
For the purpose of recommending the minimum rate of wages
to be paid, the Act provides for the appointment of an "Industry
Committee" for each industry engaged in commerce or in the pro-
duction of goods for commerce. 26 (Industry committees have been
appointed for the textile, apparel and wool industries.) The com-
mittee shall consist of three groups-a number of disinterested
persons representing the public, a like number representing em-
ployes in the industry, and a like number representing the em-
ployers. A member of the public group must act as chairman, and
in appointing each group the Administrator must give due regard
to the geographical regions in which the industry is carried on.?
Provisions are made for a reasonable per diem compensation,
and the Committee is given authority to summon witnesses. The
Administrator is required to submit data to the Industry Commit-
tee from time to time for the purpose of enabling it to arrive at
a recommendation with reference to the minimum wages to be
paid in the industry.28
"Sec. 12 (b).
"See. 6 (a).
"Sec. 8 (a).
"Sec. 5 (a).
21Sec. 5 (b).
2"Sec. 5 (d).
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The Industry Committee, after investigating conditions in the
industry, hearing witnesses, and receiving evidence, must recom-
mend to the Administrator the highest minimum wage rates for
the industry which it deems will not substantially curtail employ-
ment in the industry.29 Such minimum wage shall, of course, not
exceed forty cents an hour.
Certain guide posts are established for the conduct of the Com-
mittee.3 0 The Committee may make reasonable classifications with-
in an industry and shall recommend the highest minimum wage for
each classification which will not substantially curtail employment
and will not give a competitive advantage to any group in the in-
dustry. No classification may be made solely on a regional basis,
but the Industry Committee shall consider certain relevant fac-
tors, including competitive conditions as affected by living and
other costs, wages established for similar work by collective labor
agreements, and wages paid for similar work by employers who
voluntarily maintain minimum wage standards in the industry.
It is forbidden to make any classification on the basis of age or sex.
It should be noted that while classifications on a regional basis
are forbidden, since competitive conditions "as affected by trans-
portation, living and production costs" may be considered in fix-
ing the minimum wage in the various classifications, there will be
geographical differences in minimum wages resulting from the
fact that living costs are lower in some sections of the country than
in others.
The Industry Committee must file its report with the Adminis-
trator, after which due notice must be given to interested persons
and they must have an opportunity to be heard. After such hear-
ing the Administrator, if he approves the recommendations of the
Industry Committee, must make an order establishing the recom-
mended minimum wage. If he disapproves of the recommendation
he shall refer the matter back to the Committee, or if he prefers,
he may appoint another Industry Committee for the purpose of
further consideration and recommendations. 3' It is important to
note that the Administrator can not fix the minimum wage except
upon the recommendation of an Industry Committee, although he
is not required to accept the recommendation of any given commit-
tee, and may refer the matter back for consideration and recon-
sideration. Orders are required to be published in the Federal
Register.
32
Provision is made for requiring the attendance of witnesses and
production of records in accordance with the rules of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.
33
Maximum Hours
The maximum hour provision does not set a maximum week be-
yond which an employee may not work. It merely requires the pay-
'Sec. 8 (b).
"Sec. 8 (c).
"Sec. 8 (d).
"Sec. 8 (f).
"Sec. 9.
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ment of time and a half for all overtime worked in excess of the
maximum number of hours set by the Act. It has been suggested,
and it is no doubt true, that the purpose in requiring the payment
of time and a half for overtime was to curtail hours of employment
and thus spread employment more widely.
With certain exceptions to be later noted, no employer may
employ an employee who is engaged in commerce or in the pro-
duction of goods for commerce for more than forty-four hours per
hours per week during the second year following October 24, 1938;
or forty hours per week after the expiration of the second year
from October 24, 1938, unless the employee is paid time and a half
for such overtime.3 4 Exceptions to the requirement that overtime
be paid are made in the following instances :35
1. Where there is a collective bargaining agreement made by
employees, certified as bona fide by the National Labor Relations
Board, which limits employment to 1000 hours during any twenty-
six consecutive weeks.
2. Where there is a collective bargaining agreement made by
employees, certified as bona fide by the National Labor Relations
Board, which limits employment to 2000 hours during any fifty-two
consecutive weeks.
3. For not to exceed fourteen work weeks in the aggregate in
any calendar year in an industry found by the Administrator to
be of a seasonal nature.
There is the limitation upon these exceptions, however, that the
employee must receive pay at the rate of time and a half the regu-
lar rate for employment in excess of twelve hours in any work day
or in excess of fifty-six hours in any work week.
The overtime provision does not apply at all to an employer
engaged in the first processing of milk, cream, etc., into dairy
products, or in the processing of cotton seed, sugar beets, and cer-
tain other agricultural products. In the case of an employer
engaged in the first processing or canning of certain perishable or
seasonal fruits or vegetables, or in the first processing within the
area of production (as defined by the Administrator) of any agri-
cultural or horticultural commodity during season operations, the
overtime provision shall not apply during the period or periods
of not more than fourteen work weeks in the aggregate of any
calendar year.'
The expression "area of production" has been defined by the
Administrator,3 7 but its uncertainty has caused both the Admin-
"'Sec. 7 (a).
"Sec. 7 (b).
"Sec. 7 (c).
"In the Regulations issued by the Administrator on October 20, 1938,
as Part 536, Title 29-Labor, Ch. V--"Area of Production" is thus de-
fined:
"An employer shall be regarded as engaged in the first processing of
any agricultural or horticultural commodity "during seasonal operations
within the 'area of production' within the meaning of Section 7 (c)
(a) if the first processing is conducted on a farm and is performed
on agricultural or horticultural commodities produced exclusively on
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istrator and employers some concern. It will be noted that the
newspaper report38 of the Administrator's recommendations to
Congress contained the suggestion that it define the area of pro-
duction by proper legislation.
There has been much discussion of the right of an employer to
reduce his regular hourly wage to a point still above the minimum
wage set by the Act but nevertheless low enough so that the pay-
ment for overtime at the rate of time and a half would still leave
the employee receiving the same amount that he received prior to
the passage of the Act. This question is closely akin to the question
whether the Act effectively prohibits the reduction of wages paid
at the time it became effective. Congress apparently desired to
prevent the lowering of wages by providing 9 that
"No provision of this Act shall justify any employer in re-
ducing a wage paid by him which is in excess of the applic-
able minimum wage under this Act, or justify any employer in
increasing hours of employment maintained by him which
are shorter than the maximum hours applicable under this
Act."
An examination of the Act, however, fails to disclose any effec-
tive means of enforcing this provision, and the Administrator has
been variously reported as indicating both that he believed wages
could not legally be lowered, and on the other hand, that he did
not believe that the Act was effective to prevent it. Unless this
problem is clarified by further legislation, litigation is certain to
determine the effect of the quoted provision.
Exemptions
The Act provides rather numerous exemptions from the wages
and hours provisions,"0 among them being the following: Those
employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, professional or
local retailing capacity, or as outside salesmen; employees engaged
in any retail or service establishment, the greater part of whose
selling or servicing is in intrastate commerce; seamen; certain air
carrier employees; fishermen; agricultural workers; learners, ap-
prentices, and handicapped workers, pursuant to regulations of
the Administrator; employees of certain classes of newspapers with
a circulation of less than 3000; employees of street, suburban or
interurban electric railways or local trolley or motor bus carriers;
certain employees in the processing of agricultural or horticultural
commodities or dairy products. The maximum hours provisions do
not apply in certain cases where the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion has jurisdiction over the employees. 41
The Administrator is given power, where it is necessary in order
such farm, or
(b) if the commodities processed are obtained from farms in the im-
medite locality of the processing establishment and the number of em-
ployees there engaged in such processing does not exceed seven."
"
3See Note 5, supra.
"
9Sec. 18.
ISec. 13 (a).
"Sec. 13 (b).
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to prevent curtailment of opportunities for employment, to permit
the employment of learners, apprentices, messengers, and handi-
capped persons at wages lower than the minimum wage otherwise
fixed, and subject to other restrictions. 42
Several of the enumerated exemptions have caused some diffi-
culty in their application. It has been deemed by some employers
that the regulation of the Administrator defining executive, ad-
ministrative and professional employees43 is rather narrow and too
restrictive. Particular reference is made to the requirement in the
definition of each that these employees do "no substantial amount
of work of the same nature as that performed by non-exempt em-
ployees of the employer". What constitutes a "substantial amount
of work"?
Judicial Review
Any person aggrieved by an order of the Administrator issued
under Section 8 of the Act, the provision covering "Wage Orders",
may obtain a review of the order in the circuit court of appeals of
the United States in any circuit where he resides or has his princi-
"Sec. 14.
,"In the Regulations issued by the Administrator on October 19, 1938,
as Part 541, Title 29, Labor, Ch. V., the terms "executive and adminis-
trative" and "professional" are thus defined:
"EXECUTM AND ADMINISTRATIE-The term 'employee employed In
a bona fide executive and administrative... capacity' in Section 13 (a)(1) of the Act shall mean any employee whose primary duty Is the man-
agement of the establishment, or a customarily recognized department
thereof, in which he is employed, and who customarily and regularly
directs the work of other employees therein, and who has the authority
to hire and fire other employees or whose suggestions and recommenda-
tions as to the hiring and firing and as to the advancement and promo-
tion or any other change of status of other employees will be given par-
ticular weight, and who customarily and regularly exercises discretionary
powers, and who does no substantial amount of work of the same nature
as that performed by non-exempt employees of the employer, and who
is compensated for his services at not less than $30 (exclusive of board,
lodging or other facilities) for a workweek.
"PRoFEssioNAL-The term 'employee employed in a bona fide.. pro-
fessional . . . capacity' In Section 13 (a) (1) of the Act shall mean any
employee
(a) who is customarily and regularly engaged in work(1) predominantly intellectual and varied in character as op-
posed to routine mental, manual, mechanical or physical
work, and(2) requiring the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment
both as to the manner and time of performance, as opposed
to work subject to active direction and supervision, and(3) of such a character that the output produced or the result
accomplished cannot be standardized in relation to a given
period of time, and(4) based upon educational training in a specially organized
body of knowledge as distinguished from a general academic
education and from an apprenticeship and from training in
the performance of routine mental, manual, mechanical or
physical processes in accordance with a previously indicated
or standardized formula, plan or procedure, and(b) who does no substantial amount of work of the same nature as
that performed by non-exempt employees of the employer."
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pal place of business, or in the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia, by filing a written petition within sixty
days after the entry of the order.14 A copy of the petition must
be served upon the Administrator, and he must then file a certified
transcript of the record. Thereafter the Court is given exclusive
jurisdiction to consider and affirm or modify the order. The review
by the Court is limited by the Act to questions of law. However,
it is specifically provided that the Administrator's findings of
fact shall be conclusive when supported by substantial evidence,
and to that extent at least, therefore, the Court is empowered to
examine into the facts.
The Supreme Court of the United States in its recent decision
in the Consolidated Edison Co." case read into the Wagner Act
the requirement that there be "substantial" evidence, although the
word does not appear in the Act itself, and gave its general defini-
tion of such evidence, saying:
"Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
It is reasonable to assume that the same test will be applied to
findings of fact under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Objections to orders of the Administrator shall not be considered
by the Court unless made before the Administrator or good excuse
shown for failure so to do. The Court may on proper application
grant leave to adduce additional testimony, and the Administrator
is granted authority to modify his findings by reason of such addi-
tional evidence. There is reserved to the Supreme Court the right
to review on certiorari or certification.
Commencement of judicial proceedings does not act as a stay
of the Administrator's order, although a stay may be granted by
the Court upon the filing of a sufficient surety bond for the pro-
tection of the affected employees.46
Child Labor Provisions
Producers, manufacturers, and dealers are prohibited from ship-
ping or delivering for shipment in interstate commerce any goods
produced in an establishment situated in the United States in or
about which any oppressive child labor has been employed within
thirty days prior to the removal of the goods from such establish-
ment.47 "Oppressive child labor" is defined 48 as the employment of
(1) Any employee under sixteen years of age in any occupation,
(except the employment of such minor by his parent or a person
standing in loco parentis in an occupation other than manufactur-
ing or mining) ; or
"Sec. 10 (a).
'"Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S.
Ct. 206.
'Sec. 10 (b).
"See. 12 (a).
'Sec. 3 (1).
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(2) The employment of any person between the ages of sixteen
and eighteen years in any occupation which the Chief of the Chil-
dren's Bureau in the Department of Labor shall by order declare
to be particularly hazardous for the employment of such children
or detrimental to their health or well-being.
Employers employing persons for whom they shall have on file
a certificate of the Chief of the Children's Bureau, certifying that
such employee is above the oppressive child labor age, are protected.
By regulation, "Certificates of Age" issued by the proper authori-
ties in approved states will be accepted in lieu of certificates issued
by the Chief of the Children's Bureau in the Department of Labor.
The State of Washington is now duly approved for this purpose.
Pursuant to proper regulations issued authorizing the same, chil-
dren between the ages of fourteen and sixteen may be employed in
occupations other than manufacturing and mining to the extent
authorized by such regulations and during periods which will not
interfere with their schooling and under conditions which will not
interfere with their health and well-being.
The child labor provisions do not apply to any child employed
in agriculture while not legally required to attend school or to any
child employed as an actor in motion pictures or theatrical pro-
ductions.
49
It is to be assumed that the Court will construe the child labor
provisions strictly, and a literal construction of the Act would
make it unlawful to ship or deliver for shipment in interstate
commerce goods produced in an establishment in which oppressive
child labor has been employed, even though the child employee in
question may not have worked upon the particular goods in any
manner. It will be interesting to see how far the courts will actu-
ally uphold a literal construction of the Act. The Act is, of course,
wholly inapplicable where no goods are shipped in interstate com-
merce from the establishment in which oppressive child labor is
employed.
Enforcement
It is declared unlawful 0 for any person to ship, deliver, or sell
in interstate commerce, or to ship, deliver or sell with knowledge
that shipment, delivery or sale in interstate commerce is intended,
any goods in which any employee was employed in violation of
the wage and hour provisions of the Act, or in violation of any
regulation issued under the learners, apprentices, and handi-
capped workers provision. Common carriers transporting any
such goods are protected if such goods were not produced by
the carrier. For the purposes of the foregoing provisions, proof
4Sec. 13 (c).
14See. 15 (a).
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that an employee was employed in the place where goods shipped
or sold in commerce were produced within ninety days prior to the
removal of the goods from such place is deemed prima facie evi-
dence that such employee was engaged in the production of such
goods.1 Violations of the wage and hour sections are prohibited.
Of particular importance is the provision making it unlawful
to discharge or in any manner discriminate against an employee
because the employee has filed any complaint or participated in
any proceedings under the Act or has testified in any such pro-
ceeding or has served on an Industry Committee. Violation of any
child labor provision and of the section requiring the keeping of
records by employers or making false statements in connection
therewith is similarly declared unlawful. Any person who wilfully
violates any of the above provisions is subject to a fine of not more
than $10,000.00 or imprisonment for not more than six months, or
both.' 2 Imprisonment, however, may be imposed only upon a sec-
ond offense and conviction.
Of immediate importance to all employers is the provision au-
thorizing employees to collect from employers who violate the wage
or hour provisions the amount of their unpaid minimum wages or
overtime compensation, and an additional equal amount as liqui-
dated damages.' 3 In the event of suit the Court shall allow the
employee a reasonable attorney's fee in addition to any judgment
awarded him, and also the costs of the action. Suit may be brought
in any court of competent jurisdiction by one employee or by a
representative for other employees, thus enabling employees to
proceed to assert their rights economically.
The Administrator has declared "that an employer can not
legally escape the provisions of the Act by obtaining the consent
of an employee to overtime work."'4 It is to be expected that if
this problem is presented to the courts, the Administrator's posi-
tion in this regard will be supported. A controversy under the Fair
Labor Standards Act can be said to be one of public concern and
affected with a public interest in view of the purpose of the Act.
The Supreme Court of the State of Washington had a very similar
question before it in the case of Larsen vs. Rice," where the Court
permitted recovery by a woman employee under the state Women's
Minimum Wage Law, although it was proven that a compromise
and settlement had been entered into.
The commission of any of the prohibited acts hereinabove enu-
merated, and contained in Section 15 of the Act, may be restrained
by any District Court of the United States, subject to the pro-
visions of Section 20 of the Clayon Act.' 6
','See. 15 (b).
" Sec. 16 (a).
"3See. 16 (b).-
"Seattle Post-Intelligencer, November 21, 1938.
1100 Wash. 642, 171 Pac. 1037.
o*Sec. 17.
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No provision of the Act shall excuse non-compliance with any
federal or state law or municipal ordinance establishing a higher
minimum wage than that established under the Act or a lower
maximum hour week than that established thereunder, nor shall
any provision thereof justify non-compliance with any federal or
state law or municipal ordinance establishing a higher child labor
standard.5 7
Constitutionality
While the question is not entirely free from doubt, it is generally
believed that the constitutionality of the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938 will be sustained by the Supreme Court if challenged,
although if the same question had been presented immediately
following the decisions in the Schechter 8 ease and in the Carter5"
case, the result would probably have been different. The inter-
vening decisions 6° passing upon the Wagner Act have shown so
liberal an attitude toward the regulation of social and economic
conditions under the aegis of the Commerce Clause that there
would seem to be little question about the right of Congress to
legislate with reference to wages, hours and child labor in the
manner of this Act. The changes in the personnel of the Supreme
Court which have occurred since the Carter and Schechter cases,
and in fact since the decisions under the Wagner Act, have of
course resulted in a greater predominance of liberal judges, and
it is scarcely to be expected that the Court as presently constituted
will take a less liberal view of such economic legislation than was
taken by it in passing upon the Jones & Laughlin case.
The question under the recent N.L.R.B. decisions seems to be
principally whether the conditions, practices, or activities forbid-
den by the Act have any substantial effect upon interstate com-
merce or the flow of goods in interstate commerce. Under the
Jones & Laughlin case the effect may not be too remote or indirect,
but legislation is not limited to transactions which are a direct part
of interstate commerce. As was said in that ease :61
"The congressional authority to protect interstate commerce
from burdens and obstructions is not limited to transactions
which can be deemed to be an essential part of a 'flow' of inter-
state or foreign commerce. Burdens and obstructions may be
due to injurious action springing from other sources. The
"'Sec. 18.
OSchechter Poultry Corp. v. U. S., 295 U. S. 495, 55 S. C. 837, 79 L.
Ed. 1570.
rCarter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 56 S. Ct. 855, 80 L. Ed. 1160.
cNational Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U. S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615, 81 L. Ed. 893; National Labor Relations Board v.
Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U. S. 49, 57 S. Ct. 642, 81 L. Ed. 918; National
Labor Relations Board v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U. S.
58, 57 S. Ct. 645, 81 L. Ed. 921; Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. National
Labor Relations Board, 303 U. S. 453, 58 S. Ct. 656, 82 L. Ed. 954; Con-
solidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206.
6181 L. Ed. 893, at 911.
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fundamental principle is that the power to regulate commerce
is the power to enact 'all appropriate legislation' for 'its pro-
tection and advancement'."
Of course all distinctions between interstate commerce and intra-
state commerce have not disappeared. The act prohibited or regu-
lated must still bear a close and intimate relationship with inter-
state commerce. Nevertheless, in view of the findings and declared
policy of Congress set forth in the Act, and in view of the Wagner
Act decisions, it is to be expected that the Fair Labor Standards
Act will be sustained. It is to be noted that Congress heeded the
admonition of Mr. Justice Cardozo in his concurring opinion in
the Schechter case by setting up standards and guides for the
determinations of the Industry Committees and of the Adminis-
trator.
The legal position of the minimum wage provisions of the Act
is strengthened and supported by the decision in West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish,2 in which case the constitutionality of the State
of Washington Minimum Wage Law for women employed in cer-
tain industries was sustained, for running through the decision is
a recognition of the principle that wages and the health and morals
of employees are connected, and that the one has a bearing upon
the other. While this case, of course, was not concerned with the
problem of interstate commerce, the finding of the Court can never-
theless be urged in support of the findings of Congress with ref-
erence to the effect which conditions of employment are said to have
upon interstate commerce and industries engaged therein.
To uphold the validity of the child labor provisions of the Act
it would be necessary for the Court to overrule Hammer vs."
Dagenhart," but it is considered by many that the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes, rather than the majority opinion
of Mr. Justice Day, now represents the true view of the Supreme
Court of the United States on this question, and it is altogether
reasonable to assume that Hammer vs. Dagenhart will be overruled
when the question is presented.
Conclusion
It is too early to weigh or appraise the Fair Labor Standards
Act, nor can one at this time prophesy whether or not it will accom-
plish all the hopes of its proponents. That it will result in improv-
ing the working and living conditions of many persons can not be
doubted. Are the fears of its opponents that it will unsettle indus-
try and result in unemployment well founded? This question has,
of course, not yet been answered. Only a thorough and fair trial
of the Act, based upon the complete cooperation of industry, can
give a correct answer to this question. In a day when such legisla-
tion is the rule rather than the exception, it is to be doubted that
industry can not adjust itself to the changes which will, of course,
be required by the Fair Labor Standards Act.
--300 U. S. 379, 57 S. Ct. 578, 81 L. Ed. 703.
"Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 38 S. Ct. 529.
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Many problems in addition to those already discussed in this
article have arisen to haunt those administering the Act. The regu-
lation of piece work and home work presents many difficulties.
Further legislation will undoubtedly be necessary to solve those
problems as well as others which are bound to arise.
Not the least of the problems following in the wake of the en-
forcement of the provisions of the Wages and Hours Law is that
arising out of the fact that persons similarly engaged in the same
industry, in the same locality, and perhaps even in the same estab-
lishment may find that their wage scales are different because the
one is producing goods for interstate commerce and the other for
intrastate commerce only. This has already resulted in the proposal
that a uniform Fair Labor Standards Act be prepared for sub-
mission to the various state legislatures in the hope that working
conditions in intrastate commerce and interstate commerce may
be made uniform.
Our Nihilistic Philosophy
Intent upon pecuniary or honorific gain, the profession has
stood singularly high above class biases; it has been as willing to serve
the more aggressive portions of the underworld as to serve the business
system, as willing to serve labor unions (provided their treasuries were
substantial) as the great middle-class of economically favored rentiers.
It has withheld its services from the indigent aristocrat and from the
bankrupt business man just as scrupulously as from the socially sub-
merged one-third to one-half of the citizenry. But, although no a priori
social philosophy in particular is entertained by the legal profession as
a whole, least of all any integrated philosophy of law, a nihilistic philos-
ophy Is implied in its work in the sense that it denies by implication
any objective or real ground of truth. .. "
-From The Legal Profession, a Social Phenomenon, by
Ferdinand Lundberg, in Harper's Magazine, December, 1938.
The Lawyer Men
Bumstead, Cooley, Cohen & Quill
Have given me many a nasty chill:
Well, Lawyers will.
To-wit, to-whoo, to-wit, to-whoo,
What on earth can a client do?
I had a deal, a lovely thing.
With the prosperous firm. of Ding & Ling:
* * * *:
To-wit, to-whoo, the deal fell through:
Oh, what on earth can a client do?
Well, I'll close my books and file the brief
As a museum piece; go on relief,
Pull in my belt and pay the bill
Of Bumstead, Cooley, Cohen & Quill.
-WILFRED FUNK, in the Saturday Evening Post,
February 4th, 1939.
WE, WHO STATE CASES FOR OTHERS, LEAVE OUR OWN CASE
TO BE MIS-STATED BY OTHERS.
